义务论的义务论的两种类型

义务论的义务论的两种类型

义务论有两种类型： 行为义务论(act-deontology)和规则义务论(rule-deontology)。 行为义务论者视每一个行为皆是独一无二的伦理事件(a unique ethical occasion),我们必须凭良心(conscience)或直觉(intuition)来决定其对错.
行为义务论的缺点:
一,诉诸良心或直觉似乎不容许论辩,例如依你的直觉对病人讲真话是对的,但依我的直觉则是不对的,那么大家的道德讨论就到此为止.至多,大家劝对方再问问自己的良心.
二,规则(rules)是道德思虑(moral reasoning)所必须的.
正如赫尔(R. M. Hare)所言:「To learn to do anything is never to learn to do an individual act; it is always to learn to do acts of a certain kind in a certain kind of situation; and this is to learn a principle....
Without principles we could not learn anything whatever from our elders.... Every generation would have to start from scratch and teach itself. But ... self-teaching, like all other teaching, is the teaching of principles. [Hare, The Language of Morals, Oxford University Press, 1952, p.60]
三,不同的情况也会有共同的特征,因此对这些情况作不同的道德指令是不一致的.
例如:你指责甲同学借光图书馆的参考书又不看是不对的,但是你认为自己这样做就没问题.
道德涉及一普通的要求,伦理学中称此为「可普遍化原则」(the principle of universalizability):
If one judges that X is right (or wrong) or good (or bad), then one is rationally committed to judging anything relevantly similar to X as right (or wrong) or good (or bad).
如果可普遍化原则是成立的话,则行为义务论便站不住.
因此,规则义务论是比较合理的义务论. 规则义务论接受可普遍化原则，并且主张：道德判断是基於道德原则而作的。
例如:「我们不应讲大话」,「我们要守诺言」,「我们不应杀害无辜」等。
规则义务论亦有不同系统,可分为「规则直觉主义」(rule-intuitionism)和「规则理性主义」(rule-rationalism);亦可分为「客观主义」(objectivism)和「绝对主义」(absolutism).